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SPECTRUM SHARING IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK THROUGH 
MATRIX BIDDING MULTI UNIT COMBINATORIAL AUCTION 
SUMMARY 
Cognitive Radio (CR) is a promising concept to improve spectrum utilization of the 
existing spectrum bands. In this thesis, spectrum sharing problem between primary 
users (licensed) and secondary users (unlicensed), who want to use opportunistically 
the primary users’ spectrum is investigated. One particular form of trading for the 
spectrum is auction, which is an applied branch of the game theory, and widely 
known for providing efficient allocation of scarce resources. Sellers use auctions to 
improve their revenue by dynamic pricing based on demands of buyers. Buyers 
benefit from auctions since resources would be assigned to those who value them the 
most. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first in which matrix bidding 
multi unit combinatorial auction is proposed to share the available spectrum of 
primary user’s among the secondary users.Combinatorial auction (CA) is a good 
candidate to solve spectrum allocation problem since it focuses on providing 
complementary and substitutable solutions. In the content of this thesis combinatorial 
auction allocate the valuable scarce spectrum to the secondary user on the basis of 
“bid matrix” submitted by secondary users rather than a single bid. Sending bid to 
the auctioneer as a combination of items is one of the most important feature of CA. 
Each channel is considered as a virtual channel comprising of multi slots.   
Submitting “bid matrix” provides secondary user an opportunity to get multiple slots 
from different channels in an auction. In CASS two important concepts we use one is 
combinatorial auction and the other one is matrix bidding. We consider that sharing 
in cognitive radio network is heterogeneous. Because of heterogeneousity the 
available channels from primary users are different from each other. We also 
consider multi unit auction not single unit. Because each channel can be divided into 
multiple units by TDMA mechanism, one secondary user can send bid for multi unit 
either from same channel or different channel. So the auction in here is a bit different 
from traditional auction. There are some renowned auction method like single 
auction, double auction, English auction and Dutch auction. But all these auction 
methods are focused on single unit not multi unit. Only combinatorial auction 
emerge for dealing with multi units. The name of this auction method shows that it 
can handle combination of items. This is the reason behind to choose the 
combinatorial concept in this thesis. But later we found some issues in combinatorial 
auction when we a secondary user sends bid to the auctioneer. Combinatorial auction 
focuses two important points one is complementarity and the other one 
substituatibiliy issue. But problem arises when the bids are not super-additive. For 
example, there are two items item1 and item2. One bidder places bid like this fashion 
b1 ({1}) = $5, b2 ({2}) = $4 and b3 ({1,2}) = $7 and there are no other bidders. The 
auctioneer has two choice the first one is allocate item1 and item2 separately for 
gaining revenue ($4+$5=$9) and the other one is allocate item1and item2 together 
for gaining revenue $7. 
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In this regard, combinatorial auction focuses on capturing synergies 
(complementarities) among items. But in practice, local substitutability (sub additive 
of the bid price) can occur as well. The scenario which is explained above, one key 
point is detected is that preference on item. The bidder did not clear his preference in 
his bid. So the auctioneer has lack of information exactly which item the bidder 
needed mostly. In this circumstance, we need some comprehensive bidding language 
like matrix bidding language. Matrix bidding language has a excellent format 
through which one bidder can show his priority among the items and his preferences. 
There are some other bidding languages like XOR. We show make a comparison 
between XOR and matrix bidding. XOR language has much more complexity that 
matrix bidding language. The details about combinatorial auction and matrix bidding 
language are given in the thesis.    
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MATRİX BİDDİNG ÇOKLU BİRİM KOMBİNATORIAL AÇİK ARTIRMA 
ARACILIĞIYLA COGNITIVE RADYO ŞEBEKE SPECTRUM PAYLAŞIM 
ÖZET 
Cognitive Radio (CR) mevcut spektrum bantlarının spektrumu kullanımı artırmak 
için gelecek vaat eden bir kavramdır.Bu tezde, birincil kullanıcıları (lisanslı) ve 
oportünist birincil kullanıcıların spektrumu incelendiğinde kullanmak istediğiniz 
ikincil kullanıcılar (lisanssız), arasındaki spektrum paylaşımı sorunu.Spektrum için 
ticaret belirli bir formu oyun teorisinin uygulamalı bir dalı olan ve yaygın olarak kıt 
kaynakların etkin tahsisi sağlamak için bilinir müzayede vardır.Satıcılar alıcıların 
talepleri doğrultusunda dinamik fiyatlandırma ile gelirlerini artırmak için ihaleleri 
kullanın.Kaynakların onları en değerli olanlar tayin edileceğini yana Alıcılar ihaleleri 
yarar.Bizim bilgimize göre bu tez ikincil kullanıcılar arasında birincil kullanıcı var 
en uygun spektrum paylaşmak için önerilen hangi matris teklif çoklu birim 
kombinatoryal açık artırmada ilk.Kombinatoryal açık artırma (CA) tamamlayıcı ve 
ikame çözümleri sağlamaya odaklanmaktadır yana spektrum tahsisi sorunu çözmek 
için iyi bir adaydır.Bu tez Kombinatoryal müzayede içeriği yerine tek bir teklif daha 
ikincil kullanıcılar tarafından gönderilmiş olan "teklif matrix" temelinde ikincil 
kullanıcıya değerli kıt spektrum tahsis.Öğeleri bir arada CA en önemli özelliklerden 
biridir olarak ihaleyi için teklif gönderiliyor.Her kanal çoklu yuva oluşan sanal bir 
kanal olarak kabul edilir."Teklif matrix" Gönderme ikincil kullanıcı bir açık 
artırmada farklı kanallardan birden yuvaları almak için bir fırsat sağlar. Matris 
formatı gibi öğesi prioriity, complimentarity ve substituatibility olarak teklif veren 
firmanın çok boyutlu bilgi göstermek için bir isteklinin kolaylaştırabilir çünkü 
Matrix teklifi en kapsamlı ihale dildir.Bu bilgiler çok kazanan teklif karar vermek 
için bir açık artırma için çok faydalıdır. CASS iki önemli kavram olarak biz bir 
kombinatoryal ihale ve diğer bir matris teklif olduğunu kullanın. Biz bilişsel radyo 
ağı bu paylaşım heterojen bir düşünün. Çünkü heterogeneousity primery 
kullanıcılardan mevcut kanal birbirinden farklıdır. Biz de çok birimi müzayede değil 
tek ünite düşünün. Her kanal TDMA mekanizma ile birden fazla üniteye ayrılabilir 
Çünkü, ikincil bir kullanıcı çoklu ünite için de aynı kanal veya farklı kanaldan teklif 
gönderebilirsiniz. Yani burada açık artırmada geleneksel açık artırma biraz farklı. 
Bazı tek açık artırma gibi tanınmış ihale yöntemi, çift müzayede, İngilizce ve 
Hollandaca müzayede müzayede vardır. Ama bütün bu ihale yöntemlerinin tek ünite 
çok değil birimi odaklandık. Sadece kombinatoryal müzayede çok üniteleri ile 
uğraşmak için ortaya çıkıyor. Bu ihale yöntemi ile ismi öğelerin birleşimi işleyebilir 
gösterir. Bu, bu tez içinde birleştirici kavramı seçmek için temel sebebi budur. 
Spektrum paylaşımı daha verimli hale ihale mekanizmasının diğer bazı avantajları 
vardır. Birincisi ve en önemlisi, olmayan bir işbirliği mekanizması olduğunu. Dışı 
kooperatif olduğu gibi, ikincil kullanıcıların aralarında mesaj alış verişi yoktur. Bu 
nedenle, açık artırma mekanizması hiçbir koordinasyon gecikme vardır. Bencillik ve 
hile genellikle paylaşımı yöntemiyle gerçekleşebilir. İkincil kullanıcılar kooperatif 
spektrum paylaşım mekanizması onların değerli bilgileri paylaşmak gerekir. Başka 
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ikincil hile olabilir çünkü bu çok riskli. Bencillik paylaşımı başka büyük bir 
sorundur. Tüm ikincil kullanıcı uygun spektrum yakalanan deneyin. Oldukça 
spektrum tahsis edilmesi de önemlidir. Müzayede mekanizması kıt kaynakların adil 
dağılımı için en iyi yöntemdir. Ayrıca kaynak kullanımı yanı sıra gelir maksimize. 
Ama daha sonra biz ikinci bir kullanıcı mezatçı için teklif gönderdiğinde 
kombinatoryal müzayede bazı sorunlar bulundu. Kombinatoryal müzayede bir 
tamamlayıcılık ve diğeri substituatibiliy konudur iki önemli nokta odaklanır. 
Tekliflerini süper katkı değildir Ama sorun doğar. Örneğin, iki öğe item1 ve item2 
vardır. Bu moda b1 gibi bir isteklinin yerlerde teklifi b1 ({1}) = $ 5, b2 ({2}) = $ 4 
ve b3 ({1, 2}) = $ 7 ve başka isteklilere vardır. Ihaleyi ilk allocate item1and item2 $7 
gelir kazanmak için birlikte olduğunu geliri ($ 4 + $ 5 = $ 9) ve diğeri kazanıyor için 
ayrı ayrı item1 ve item2 tahsis edilir iki seçenek vardır. Bu bağlamda, kombinatoryal 
açık artırma öğeleri arasında sinerji (tamamlayıcılık) yakalama odaklanır. Fakat 
uygulamada, yerel ikame (teklif fiyatı alt katkı maddesi) de oluşabilir. Yukarıda, bir 
anahtar nokta tespit edilir açıklanmıştır senaryo öğe olduğunu tercihtir. İstekli yaptığı 
teklif onun tercihi açık vermedi. Yani ihaleyi tam isteklinin en çok ihtiyaç duyulan 
hangi madde bilgi eksikliği vardır. Bu durumda, biz matriks teklif dili gibi bazı 
kapsamlı ihale dile ihtiyacımız var. XOR gibi bazı diğer teklif dil vardır. Biz XOR ve 
matris teklifi arasında bir karşılaştırma yapmak göstermektedir. XOR dil bu matrisi 
teklif dili çok daha fazla karmaşıklık var. Matrix teklif dil tek teklif sahibi öğeleri ve 
kendi tercihleri arasında onun önceliği gösterebilir hangi aracılığıyla mükemmel bir 
biçimi vardır. Kombinatoryal ihale ve matris teklif dili hakkında bilgi tez verilmiştir. 
Kanal özelliklerini analiz için, bağlı ve gerekli minimum iletim gücü geciktirebilir, 
bu kablosuz bağlantı hata oranı, bağlantı katmanı gecikme ve ikincil kullanıcı talebi 
kabul edilebilir hata oranı yanı sıra izin verilen maksimum iletim gücü olarak üç 
spektrum karakteristik parametreleri düşünün. Aslında bu parametreler ikincil 
kullanıcılar için daha iyi bir kanal seçimi için kabul edilir. İkincil kullanıcının bu üç 
eşleme faktörlere göre auctioneer için teklif gönderir. İhaleye çıkan ikincil kullanıcı 
teklifleri ve kullanım şube ve kazanan belirlenmesi için sınır algoritması toplar. En 
az bir istekliye her bir öğeyi atıyorsanız kombinatoryal müzayede yerine ihale için en 
önemli üç görev, aynı istekliden birden fazla teklifi kabul edip bir kısmını bu konuda 
farklı bir teklif almak için birden çok teklifi yeniden birleştirilmesini gelen ihaleyi 
engelleyen mezatçı önleristekliler tarafından sunulan biridir. CASS olmayan bir 
kooperatif tayfı paylaşımı yöntemdir. Olmayan kooperatif olduğu gibi, hiçbir 
koordinasyon gecikme gibi sayısız yararları vardır, ikincil kullanıcıların dürüst 
davranır ve bencillik ve hiçbir hile yok. Işbirlikçi bir yaklaşım içinde Spectrum 
paylaşımı gibi sorunlarla karşı karşıyadır. CASS bu sorunların üstesinden bu yana, 
spektrum adil bir dağılımı sağlar. Oldukça ikincil kullanıcılar birincil kullanıcı uygun 
spektrum tahsisi bizim tez çalışmasının temel amaçlarından biridir. Son olarak, 
CASS performansını analiz etmek için, biz diğer iki spektrum paylaşım yöntemleri 
BIOSS'lar ve DMSS ile simülasyon sonuçları karşılaştırın. İşte, BIOSS kısa ve 
DMSS algoritma üzerinden gitmek. Bilişsel radyo ağı Spectrum paylaşımı böcek 
kolonisi görev tahsisi ile büyük benzerlikler vardır. Bilişsel radyo duyuları daha 
sonra mevcut spektrum bantları ve için çevreyi aynı anda kullanılabilir spektrum 
bantları kendi paketlerini iletir. Benzer şekilde, bir böcek kolonisi, bireylerin daha 
sonra kullanılabilir görevleri ve mevcut görevler daha iyi işler için donanımlı bireyler 
tarafından gerçekleştirilir için feromon çevreyi seziyorum. Biyolojik modelde her 
görevi daha iyi görevi gerçekleştirirken olasılık ile bu görev için donanımlı bireyler 
paylaştırılır. Benzer şekilde Bilişsel radyo ağ içinde uygun spektrum bantları oldukça 
etkin spektrum paylaşımı modeli ile bilişsel radyo paylaştırılmış olmalıdır. Bu 
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benzetme göre, bilişsel radyolar etkili en uygun spektrum bantları paylaşmanızı 
sağlayan kanal seçimi olasılık tanıtmak olasılık performans görevi kabul eder. 
BIOSS, böcek kolonilerinde adaptif görev tahsisi modeline dayalı ikincil 
users.BIOSS arasında herhangi bir koordinasyon ihtiyacı olmadan her lisanssız 
kullanıcının distributively bu iletişim kurabileceği üzerinde uygun kanalı belirlemek 
için kılar. Ama BIOSS yöntemi, kanal karakteristikleri ve spektrum paylaşımı için 
kullanıcı gereksinimleri de sorun var. Congnitive radyo ortamında kullanılabilir 
spektrum heterojendir ve her spektrum farklı uygulama farklı QoS talep var, farklı 
characteristics.Different ikincil kullanıcıların sahip olduğu evrenseldir. BIOSS gibi 
issue.DMSS spektrum karar modeli için bu spektrum karakteristik parametreleri 
birleştirmek ve lisanssız kullanıcılar spektrum özellikleri ve kullanıcı ihtiyacına göre 
en uygun spektrum tercih yapmak düşünmüyordu. Biz BIOS'ları CASS ve DMSS 
daha düşük bir performansa sahiptir ve CASS% 90 kullanımını sağlar olduğu 
bulundu.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The former strategy of Federal Communication Commission (FCC) is to allocate 
spectrum causes under-utilization of radio spectrum resources [2]. Day by day the 
number of wireless applications and wireless devices rapidly growing, that is why 
needed to assign spectrum to those applications and devices for operation. There are 
two limitations, which create difficulties for upcoming new wireless application and 
wireless devices. One limitation is the scarce resource of spectrum and the other one 
is the fixed spectrum allocation (FSA) strategy of FCC. So the regulatory bodies 
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have begun to consider 
more flexible and comprehensive uses of available spectrum [2]. 
Cognitive radio technology [4] is emerging in recent years as a revolutionary 
communication paradigm, which can provide faster and more reliable wireless 
services by utilizing the existing spectrum band more efficiently [5,6]. A notable 
difference of a cognitive radio from traditional wireless networks is that users need to 
be aware of the dynamic environment and adaptively adjust their operating 
parameters based on the interactions with the environment and other users in the 
network. So the term, Cognitive radio can formally be defined as follows [3]: 
  “A Cognitive Radio is a radio that can change its transmitter parameters based on 
interaction with the environment in which it operates”. 
The definition of CR as stated above, two important features of CR can be defined as 
follows [6]: 
1. Cognitive capability: This capability refers to the ability of the radio technology to 
capture or sense the information from its radio environment. Through this capability, 
the portions of the spectrum that are unused at a specific time or location can be 
identified. Consequently, the best spectrum and appropriate operating parameters can 
be selected. 
2. Reconfigurability: This feature enables the radio to be dynamically programmed 
according to the radio environment. More specifically, the cognitive radio can be 
2 
programmed to transmit and receive on a variety of frequencies and to use different 
transmission access technologies supported by its hardware design. 
The CR concept was first introduced in [4] by J. Mitola, where the main focus was 
on the radio knowledge representation language and how the cognitive radio can 
enhance the flexibility of personal wireless services.  
Finally, the CR enables the usage of temporarily unused spectrum which is referred 
to as spectrum hole or white space [6] shown in Fig.1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Spectrum hole concept [6]. 
Now we are going to explain our purpose of this thesis. 
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
There are two  important issues in auction theorem which are not focused in the most 
of the auction theories.But Combinatorial Auction focuses these two issues:  
1.  Complementarities. 
2.  Substitutability. 
Complementarities: Bidders may place combination of items. This allows a bidder to 
express complementarities between items so he does not have to speculate into an 
item’s valuation the impact of possibly getting other, complementary items. 
                                    b�(S ∪ ś) ≥ b�(S) + b��Ś�                                                        (1) 
3 
Inequality (1) show the complementarities effets for item S and Ś. 
Substitutability: Any number of bidder’s bid can be accepted.                                 b�(S ∪ ś) ≤ b�(S) + b��Ś�                                                                   (2) 
When bids are super-additive there is no problem. However, when some of the bids 
are not superadditive, this can lead to problems. For  example, what happen if bidder 
1 bids b1 ({1}) = $5, b1({2}) = $4, and b1({1, 2}) = $7, and there are no other 
bidders? The auctioneer (primary user) could allocate items 1 and 2 to bidder 1 
separately, and that bidder’s bid for the combination would value at $5 + $4 = $9 
instead of $7. So, the current techniques focus on capturing synergies 
(complementarities) among items. In practice, local substitutability (sub-additivity of 
the bid prices) can occur as well. As a simple example, when bidding for a landing 
slot for an airplane, the bidder is willing to take any one of a host of slots, but does 
not want more than one. To handle this situation we need an expressive bidding 
language, which can help secondary user to place bid to the primary user with a clear 
valuation of the items. Latter we discuss that expressive bidding language. 
In this thesis book, we proposed a combinatorial auction with matrix bid non co-
operative spectrum sharing scheme for cognitive radio network. Here two unique 
points, first one, primary user always tries to maximize revenue and second one, 
efficient allocation of available unused spectrum of primary user’s to the secondary 
user according to secondary users demand. 
1.2 Background 
Several researches have already attacked the spectrum sharing problem in CR using 
different approaches spanning from nature inspired solutions to demand matching 
and from graph coloring to auctions. 
 In [9] the proposed model where each secondary user can place bid for only one 
single unit from multiple homogenous unit. They did not thinking about multi unit    
sharing. But it is possible in cognitive radio environment one secondary user may 
win multiple unit. As they did not think about multi unit that’s why bidding language 
is very simple in this model like one SU submit bid its desire band and price for that 
band. So multiple unit auction we need some expressive bidding language for SUs to 
submit bid for multiple unit. 
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 In [10] the problem is addressed further as multiple licensed service providers 
compete with each other to offer spectrum access opportunities to the unlicensed 
users. By using an equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the licensed service providers 
aims to maximize its profit under quality of service (QoS) constraint for licensed 
users with Bertrand game model. Thus unused spectrum is allocated to the 
unlicensed users. However the coordination among cognitive radios results in large 
amount of coordination delay.    
 In [11] BIOlogically-inspired spectrum sharing (BIOSS) algorithm is introduced 
based on the adaptive task allocation model of an insect colony. Without need for 
any coordination among the unlicensed users, BIOSS enables each cognitive radio in 
the same environment distributive share the available licensed or unlicensed 
spectrum bands over which it can effectively communicate. 
However, above-mentioned algorithms do not consider the matching problem 
between channel characteristics and user requirement for the spectrum sharing. Since 
the available spectrum holes are heterogeneous, it is true that different spectrum have 
different characteristics. Meanwhile, different users usually have different QoS 
demands on various wireless applications. 
However, above algorithms do not consider the matching problem between channel 
characteristics and user requirement for the spectrum sharing. Since the available 
spectrum holes are heterogeneous, it is true that different spectrum have different 
characteristics. Meanwhile, different users usually have different QoS demands on 
various wireless applications. 
So it is important for secondary users in spectrum sharing to choose the proper 
available spectrum those are shared by primary users to fulfill secondary users 
demand. Thus in heterogeneous cognitive radio spectrum sharing environment 
sharing can be divided into two steps: 
1. Spectrum characterization of the available spectrum in the environment and 
secondary users (unlicensed) choose the most suitable spectrum according to the 
spectrum characteristics and secondary user demand. 
2. As available spectrum are non contiguous and sub divided into multiple slots, 
so secondary users have the opportunity to access multiple slots from the same 
spectrum band or may access multiple slots from available different spectrum.  
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Thus for accessing multiple unit secondary users submit bid combination of multiple 
unit to the primary users. Bids are two dimensional (slots, price).  
Because pricing can have two different goals: reaching maximum revenue for the 
network, or allocating efficiently the resources.  Here price is the amount that the 
secondary users willing to pay for the resource they demand. 
In [14] Layer and Semret prove that if players are informed of the other players bids 
when they submit their own bids, the bid profile’s  converges after a finite time to a 
Nash equilibrium that corresponds to an efficient allocation of the resources. But the 
main drawback of this of this scheme is that the convergence phase can be quite long 
and that it corresponds to a signalling burst (to  sending necessary information to 
players) which non-negligible part of the available bandwidth. The goal here is to 
change the sequential (dynamic) bid process of into a one-shot multi bid for each 
player in order to alleviate the bid-profile signalization overhead. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will explain spectrum sharing 
concept in cognitive radio, spectrum sharing challenges and auction games. In 
Chapter 3, combinatorial auction and in Chapter 4, we will explain about Matrix 
bidding language. Our system model and spectrum-sharing scenario will be outlined 
in Chapter 5. Simulation results and analysis are shown in Chapter 6. Finally in 
chapter 7, conclusion is drawn. 
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2.  SPECTRUM SHARING IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK 
2.1 Overview of Spectrum Sharing 
Traditional spectrum sharing and management approaches, generally assume that all 
network users cooperate unconditionally in a static environment, and thus they are 
not applicable to a cognitive radio network.  
In a cognitive radio network, users are intelligent and have the ability to observe, 
learn and act to optimize their performance. The importance of studying cognitive 
radio networks in a game theoretic framework is multi-fold. 
First, by modelling dynamic spectrum sharing among network users (primary and 
secondary users) as games, network user’s behaviours and actions can be analyzed in 
a formalized game structure, by which the theoretical achievements in game theory 
can be fully utilized. Second, game theory equips us with various optimality criteria 
for the spectrum-sharing problem. To be specific, the optimization of spectrum usage 
is generally a multi-objective optimization problem, which is very difficult to 
analyze and solve. Game theory provides us with well defined equilibrium criteria to 
measure game optimality under various game settings. Third, non-cooperative game 
theory, one of the most important branches of game theory, enables us to derive 
efficient distributed approaches for dynamic spectrum sharing using only local 
information. Game theoretic spectrum sharing schemes are classified into four 
categories shown in Fig.2.1 [17]. 
2.2 Game Theory for Spectrum Sharing 
Cognitive radio users or secondary users are intelligent users. Using intelligency, 
secondary users make decision on spectrum usage and operating parameters based on 
dynamically sensed spectrum. Because of their intelligency, there is no cooperating 
between the other secondary users. Therefore, it is important to analyze the 
intelligent behavior of secondary users from a game theoretic perspective. 
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Figure 2.1: Four categories of the game theoretic spectrum sharing approaches [17]. 
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Studying cognitive radio networks in a game theoretic framework is multifold. First, 
by modeling dynamic spectrim sharing among secondary users as games, secondary 
user’s behavior and actions can be analyzed in a well format game structure, by 
which the theoretical achievements in game theory can be fully utilized. Second, 
game theory equips us with various optimality criteria for the spectrum-sharing 
problem. Game theory provides us with well-defined quilibrium criteria to measure 
game optimality under various game settings. Third, non-cooperative game theory, 
one of the most important branchs of game theory, enable us to derive efficient 
distributed approaches for dynamic spectrum sharing using only local information. 
Game theory still rarely uses in engineering and computer science. Here we 
introduce the most basic game theoretic concepts and then address how these 
concepts can be leveraged in designing efficient spectrum sharing schemes from a 
network designer’s perspective. An overall scenario of different game theory 
approaches is shown in fig.2.1.  From the fig.2.1, we can see that there are four main 
game theoretic spectrum-sharing categories. We first discuss non-cooperative 
spectrum sharing gaeme in section 2.2.1, because secondary users are mostly 
assumed to be selfish and only aim to maximizing their own spectrum usage.  
2.2.1 Non-cooperative games and Nash equlibrium 
Nash equilibrium is a key concept to understand non-cooperative game theory. Nash 
equilibrium tells us what the equilibrium outcome will be but it does not answer the 
question “How can we get to the equilibrium?”. This is more important in the context 
of cognitive radio networks, where players may lack the global information to 
directly predict the equilibrium. Instead, they may start from an arbitrary strategy, 
update their strategies according to certain rules, and hopefully converge to the 
equilibrium. In general, Nash equilibrium oftern suffer from excesisive competition 
among selfish players in a non-cooperative game and the outcome of the game is 
inefficient. There are three approaches, namely, usage of pricing, repeated game and 
correlated equilibrium can improve the efficeiency of Nash equilibrium. Game 
theory is mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions among multiple 
decision makers. Three major components in a strategic-form game model, the first 
one is a finite set of players, the second one a set of actions and the last one 
payoff/utility. In opportunistic spectrum access, secondary users will choose proper 
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operating parameters to optimize the performance or quality of service (QoS) from 
sharing the spectrum. In negotiation based licensed spectrum sharing the primary 
users will announce the available spectrum bands to the secondary users and 
distributed the bands through auction.pricing, where both primary and secondary 
users can maximize their profits by leasing and licensed bands. Efficeint spectrum 
sharing schemes are essential for improving spectrum utilization. However, since 
users in a cognitive radio network are intelligent and able to observe, learn, and act to 
optimize their performance, if they belong to different authorities and pursue 
different goals, fully cooperative behavior cannot be taken for granted. Instead, 
selfish users will compete for the limited spectrum resources, and only aim to 
maximize their own benefit. As traditional spectrum sharing approaches only assume 
cooperative, static, and centralized network settings, new solution based on game 
theoretic modeling are preferred, which can offer more flexibility in analyzing 
network user’s strategic interactions and achieve efficient dynamic spectrum sharing. 
In non-cooperative spectrum sharing game with rational secondary users, each user 
only cares about his/her own benefit and choose the optimal strategy that can 
maximize his/her payoff function. Such an outcome of the non-cooperative game is 
termed as Nash equilibrium, which is the most commonly used solution concept in 
game theory [17].      
2.2.2 Economic games, Auction games and Mechanism design 
Here we do not go detail on economic games and mechanism design because we 
focus on auction games. Auction theory is an applied branch of game theory, which 
analyzes interactions in auction markets and researches the game theoretic properties 
of auction markets. An auction, conducted by an auctioneer, is a process of buying 
and selling products by eliciting bids from potential buyers (i.e bidders) and deciding 
the auction outcome based on the bids and auction rules. The rules of auction or 
auction mechanisms, determine whom the goods are allocated to and how much price 
they have to pay. An efficient and important means of resource allocation, auctions 
have a quite a long history and have been widely userd for a variety of objects 
including antiques, real properties spectrum resources and so on. There are some 
auction approaches like English auction, Dutch auction, Second price auction and 
First price auction. An auction becomes more involved when more than one item are 
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simultaneously sold and bidder bid for packags of products instead of individual 
products. There is some other game theory such cooperative game and stochastic 
game [17]. 
2.3 Spectrum Sharing Challenges 
Spectrum sharing in CR network faces a number of new challenges such as radio 
interference constraints, supporting diverse demands and online multi-unit 
allocations which are briefly explained as follows [1]. 
Radio Interference Constraints: Buyers in close proximity interfere with each other 
and cannot use the same spectrum, while well-separated buyers can reuse the same 
spectrum. Hence, spectrum auctions need to explicitly account for the impact of 
interference when determining allocations and prices. 
Supporting Diverse Demand: Spectrum auctions need to accommodate diverse 
demands. These include both traditional long-term spectrum usage using and short-
term spontaneous spectrum usage to support bursty traffic. For example, occasional 
events like sports and conferences will create demand spikes at a specific location for 
a short-period of time. It is important for these users to obtain and pay for what they 
need.  
Multi unit auction: Spectrum auctions are multi-unit auctions, where multiple 
identical copies of slots are for sale. Spectrum is divided into a number of channels. 
Users wish to obtain different amount of spectrum at their desired power level, and 
may be willing to pay differently depending on the assignment. Hence, we need a 
new bidding language to allow buyers conveniently express their desire, and do it so 
compactly. Combinatorial multi unit auction is one of the solutions of multi unit. 
Although all of the above mentioned challenges are important we focused on only 
combinatorial multi unit auction in this thesis. In order to provide a mean to deal 
with combinatorial multi unit auction we proposed matrix bidding. Matrix bidding is 
suitable for secondary users to submit their bids for slots in a multiple unit spectrum 
auction. Combinatorial auction addresses two important issues: providing 
complementarities and substitutability [8]. 
12 
2.4 Auction Games 
Auction theory is an applied branch of game theory, which analyzes interactions in 
auction markets and researches the game theoretic properties of auction markets. An 
auction, conducted by an auctioneer, is a process of buying and selling products by 
eliciting bids from potential buyers (i.e., bidders) and deciding the auction outcome 
based on the bids and auction rules. The rules of auction, or auction mechanisms, 
determine whom the goods are allocated to (i.e. the allocation rule) and how much 
price they have to pay(i.e., the payment rule). As efficient and important means of 
resource allocation auctions have quite long history and have been widely used for a 
variety of objects, including antiques, real properties, bonds, spectrum resources, and 
so on. For example, the Federal Communications Commision (FCC) has used 
auctions to award spectrum since 1994, and the United States 700 MHz FCC 
wireless spectrum auciton held in 2008. The spectrum allocation problem in 
cognitive radio networks although micro-scaled adn short termed compared with the 
FCC auctions, can also be settled by auctions. 
Auctions are used precisely because the seller is uncertain about the values that 
bidders attach to the product. Depending on the scenario, the values of different 
bidders to the same product may be independent (the private values model) or 
dependent (the independent values model). Almost all the existing literature on 
aucitons in cognitive radio networks assumes private values. Moreover, if the 
distribution of values is identical to all bidders, the bidders are symmetric. Last it sis 
common to assume a risk neutral model, where the bidders only care about the 
expected payoff, regardless of the variance (risk) of the payoff [17]. A typical 
auction scenario is shown in fig2.2. 
Following assumption for Spectrum sharing: First, buyer (secondary user) bids 
spectrum with specific but fixed power requirements, and hence focus solely on 
channel allocation.The seller (primary user) divides its spectrum into a large number 
of homogeneous channels with equal power limit and transmission bandwidth. So we 
focus on multiple distinguishable items to be allocated. 
 These auctions are complex in the general case where the bidders have preferences 
over bundles, that is, a bidder’s valuation for a bundle of items need not equal the 
sum of his valuations of the individual items in the bundle. 
13 
 
 
Figure 2.2: A dynamic auction scenario, an auctioneer performs periodic auctions. 
of spectrum to buyers  [1]. 
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3.  COMBINATORIAL AUCTION 
3.1 Definition of Combinatorial Auction 
Combinatorial Auctions (auctions in which bidders may express bids on 
combinations or bundles of goods) are motivated by the presence of synergy in 
bidder’s valuations for sets of goods. The synergy associated with a set of goods (S) 
and number of bidder (j) may be defined as  δj(S), 
                                   𝜹𝜹𝒋𝒋(𝑺𝑺) = 𝒗𝒗𝒋𝒋(𝑺𝑺) −  ∑ 𝒗𝒗𝒋𝒋({𝒊𝒊})                           𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑺𝑺                          (3) 
𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 (𝑆𝑆) is bidder j’s value for the set of goods S. 
The presence of synergistic valuations impedes the generalization of the single-good 
auctions to efficient multiple-good auctions. When synergy is positive there are 
complementarities effects; the bidder would like to tell the auctioneer, “I would give 
you more money if I could be guaranteed to get these goods together”. When synergy 
is negative, substitution effects dominate; the bidder would say, “Here are my prices, 
but I want to pay less if I get goods that are substitutes”. Preferences for a bundle 
may be referred to as sub-additive, additive, or super-additive when synergy is 
negative, zero, or positive, respectively. Clearly the auctioneer benefits from taking 
positive synergy effects into consideration; bidders will promise to pay extra if they 
are guaranteed certain combinations of goods. Though it is less immediately clear, 
the auctioneer may benefit if he is willing to consider negative synergy information 
as well. This is because a bidder will be more willing to bid up to his true value on 
small bundles if the risk of paying too much for a combined bundle is reduced or 
eliminated. In addition to the possibility of increased revenue for the auctioneer, 
taking negative synergies into account can increase the economic efficiency of an 
auction, a feature desirable in governmental auctions of electricity, radio-spectrum, 
oil-drilling rights, etc. which constitute an area of major interest in the auction 
literature.  
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In a combinatorial auction, the auctioneer collects bids bj(S) from each bidder j on 
potentially any subset S of the items in the auction. In an efficient combinatorial 
auction, the auctioneer then solves a combinatorial optimization problem, the 
winner-determination problem, which finds an allocation of items to bidders that 
maximizes the total value of accepted bids. For the most general context, this may be 
modelled as an Integer Program (IP), related to the set-packing problem, and 
described, for example, by de Vries and Vohra (2003). 
This General Winner-Determination problem (GWD) for the allocation of N items in 
the set I = {1, 2,.............N} among M bidders in the set J = {1,2,.......M}can be 
formulated as follows, with binary variables xj(S)that equal 1 if and only if bidder j is 
awarded bundle S ⫃I : 
max       ∑ ∑ bj(S)xj(S)S⫃IjϵJ                                                              (GWD) 
subject to ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 (𝑆𝑆) ≤ 1   𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗S⫄{i} ∀iϵI                                                        (4) 
∑ xj(S) ≤ 1 𝑆𝑆⫃𝐼𝐼     ∀jϵJ                                                                (5) xj(S)ϵ{0,1}, ∀S ⫃ I,∀jϵ J                                                           (6) 
Constraint set (4) ensures that each item is assigned to at most one bidder, while 
constraint set (5) prevents the auctioneer from accepting multiple bids from the same 
bidder, preventing the auctioneer from recombining multiple bids to get a different 
bid on a subset than the one submitted by the bidder [12]. 
3.2 Algorithm For Multi Unit Combinatorial Auction 
3.2.1 Branch and Bound Algorithm 
The idea of Branch and Bound algorithm find optimal allocations in combinatorial 
auction multi unit search. Let us describe briefly branch and bound search, given a 
set of bids, combinatorial auction multi unit search systematically compares the 
revenue from all allocations in order to determine the optimal allocation. This 
comparison is implemented as depth-first search: we build up a partial allocation one 
bid at a time. Once we have constructed a full allocation we back-track, removing the 
most recently added bid from the partial allocation and adding a new bid instead. 
Sometimes we can safely prune the search tree, backtracking before a full allocation 
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has been constructed. Every time a bid is added to the current location, combinatorial 
auction multi unit search computes an estimate of the revenue that will be generated 
by the unallocated goods which remain. Provided that this estimate function o() 
always provides an upper bound on the actual revenue, we can prune whenever 
p(𝜋𝜋)+o(𝜋𝜋)<= p(𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ), where π is the best current allocation, p(𝜋𝜋)=∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗𝜋𝜋  and 
𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏  is the best allocation observed so far. 
   
. 
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4.  BIDDING LANGUAGE 
4.1 Matrix Bidding 
A bidder in this model specifies her preferences with a value for each item in each of 
its possible rankings in the final bundle. The bid offered for item (i) by bidder (j) 
given that it is the kth best item she receives would be denoted bijk. Bidder j’s bid on 
a bundle S may then be computed as: bj(S) =  ∑ bij k(i, s)iϵS                                               (7) 
where K(i , S) gives the ordinal ranking of item i among the items in S. For example, 
K({i, S) = 1 if no item in S has a higher rank than item i. Similarly, K ({i, S) = 2 if 
exactly one item in bundle S has a higher rank than item i etc. A bidder interprets 
each matrix bid entry as an incremental bid on an item; the row indicates which item 
is bid on, while the column tells the ranking of the item within the bundle it brings 
value to. The matrix bid itself interpreted as a collection of bids on any possible 
subset, each bid equal to the sum of incremental values for the items. Each bidder 
submits an ordered list of the items to establish the values of rij and a matrix 
containing non-negative values of bijk (for simplicity we assume integer values 
throughout). The matrix of bijk entries together with the precedence ordering rij 
referred to as a matrix bid. 
The following simple rules summarize how to interpret a matrix bid: 
• When an item is awarded to a bidder, the auctioneer receives a single bid 
from the corresponding row in that bidder's matrix bid. 
• Only a single bid may be taken from any column.  
• Except for bid entries in the first column, a bid may not be used unless a bid 
in the previous column and a higher row is also used [13]. 
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4.2 Example of Matrix Bidding 
Suppose a bidder is submitting his preferences for the following entertainment 
choices on a specific date: a ticket to the afternoon baseball game, a coupon for 
dinner at a nearby restaurant, a day-pass to a water-park (outside of town), and a 
ticket to a matinee at the local theatre. He reasons that the matinee and baseball game 
conflict; he cannot go to both, but can make it to dinner after either one. He decides 
that if he gets any of the other items he will not leave town to go to the water-park. 
His matrix bid may appear as follows: 
Table 4.1: Matrix Bid for four items. 
 
 
 
Priority 
Football 40 
Matinee 10      0 
Dinner 25      25    25 
Water-
park 
40       0      0         0 
 
The order rij is given in the outside column with baseball being priced first, the 
matinee second and so forth. The first column inside the matrix (always) gives the 
bid on the good in that row if it is the first (or only) good received. The second 
column gives the price for each good in the row given that it is the second highest 
good received etc. If he receives a baseball ticket he is willing to pay 0 for the 
matinee which he cannot attend due to conflict. If he receives either baseball or 
matinee in the first column he would being willing to pay 25 for the meal (in the 
second column). Although the seller is unlikely to give away the matinee ticket, the 
mathematical formulation does not necessarily rule this out. If the auctioneer gives 
him the baseball ticket at 40 and the matinee ticket at 0, he is still willing to pay 25 
for the dinner, and expresses this with a 25 in the third column; a free matinee ticket 
does not change his preferences for the dinner. The fourth row shows that he would 
pay 30 for the water-park pass by itself, but would pay 0 for it if any other items are 
won. The bid of 30 cannot be accepted with any other bid by the rules outlined 
above. Another example of matrix bidding, a major TV network has 4 available 
advertise time slots. X,Y,Z companies have different marketing strategies 
determining their preference for these time slots in this fashion X need exactly two 
time slots, are indifferent to which two. Y think slots B and C are more effective 
because are occurring in the middle of the program than A and D beginning and 
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ending. Z agrees slots B and C superior than A and D. But they are interested in each 
viewing. The matrix bids these companies submit are: 
Table:4.2 Matrix bid of four different time slot. 
         Bidder X 
   
   
   
  p
rio
rit
y 
A 0 
B 0  30 
C 0  30  0 
D 0  30  0   0 
 
         Bidder Y 
   
   
   
  p
rio
rit
y 
A 20 
B 20  6 
C 10  4  0 
D 10  4  0   0 
 
         Bidder Z 
   
   
   
  p
rio
rit
y 
A 7 
B 6  7 
C 5  6  7 
D 4  5  6   7 
 
 
The optimal value for the winner-determination problem is 57: Bidder X receives 
goods A and D, contributing 30 to the objective function; Bidder Y receives good C 
for 20 units, while Bidder Z pays 7 units for B. These examples show the ability of 
the matrix bid format to express several types of preferences. The first example 
shows the ability to model a precedence relation where certain goods preclude one 
another while others do not. In the second example the goods are thought of as 
substitutes by Bidder Y, complements by Bidder Z, and somewhere in between by 
Bidder X who shows preference for a specific quantity. 
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5.   SPECTRUM SHARING MODEL 
5.1 System Model 
Our proposed system model is shown in fig5.1. We think a heterogenous 
environment where different types of channels are available for seceondary user for a 
very very small period. In fig5.1, it is shown that there K number of channes form 
primary users are available and each channel are subdivided into multiple solts with 
TDMA mechanism and N unlicensed users or secondary usrs are trying to accesss 
those slots.   
Figure 5.1: Multi unit spectrum sharing scheme to N secondary users. 
5.2 Oligopoly Market 
Spectrum sharing model in fig.5.1 is similar to oligopoly market in economics. In 
economics an oligopoly market where different manufacturers offer the same good 
with similar qualities. In this market the manufacturers compete with each other try 
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to achieve their objectives (maximize profit) independently and non-cooperatively 
through controlling the quantity or the price of supplied product. So price of the 
market may manipulate by one or all manufacturers. In this market the decision of 
each manufacturer is influenced by other manufacturer actions and action of one 
manufacturer may be observed by other manufacturer. Here, manufactures are 
primary users, consumers are secondary users and goods are frequency spectra 
(channel) which could be shared for specific times. Here we see that K blocks of 
non-contiguous spare spectrum (channels) are available for sharing in the cognitive 
radio environment. These K blocks of non-contiguous spectrum band come from 
different primary users. Each block is sub divided into M slots and these slots can be 
utilized by N number of secondary users. As our thoughts focus on multi unit 
sharing, the above model in fig. 5.1 multiple users share the same spectrum band 
according to spectrum decision, they access different time slots of the channel to 
avoid interfering each other. Every available spectrum in sharing environment has its 
unique characteristics, so it is a heterogeneous channel environment in cognitive 
radio spectrum sharing. Secondary users have various types of application that’s why 
they need to select proper channel among the available K channels. For example a 
secondary user may wish to mainly transmit delay-sensitive traffic like voice or 
video. Such a secondary user will attach a high demand on available higher 
bandwidth spectrum and pay high price. Another secondary user may be interested in 
transmitting delay-insensitive traffic such as email or file transfer. Such secondary 
user will prefer less demand and prefer low price than former. One more situation 
may arise like one secondary user may have mixed traffic delay-sensitive and delay 
insensitive, such secondary user may prefer mixed channel some of from higher 
bandwidth some of from low bandwidth. Thus spectrum characterization parameters 
such as wireless link error (Ek) rate, the link layer delay (Dk) and the maximum 
permissible transmission power (Qk), etc. Secondary users demand acceptable error 
rate (ej), the delay bound (dj) and the minimum required transmission power (qj). In 
[14] authors analyze the above parameters for better channel selection for secondary 
users. They define 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘  , 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘  error rate matching factor, delay matching factor, 
and power matching factor between demand of user j and the characteristic of 
channel K respectively, which are as follows: 
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                                               𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘   = � 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗    0   𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏      Ek  ej                                       (8) 
                                               𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘   = � Dk𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗    0   𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏      Dk  dj   (9) 
                                         𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘=   � qj𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘    0   𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏      qj Qk (10) 
Taking the matching factor  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘  as an example. If the link layer delay Dk of channel 
K is higher than the maximum delay bound dj of user j, user j is not permitted to 
access channel k in term of the delay , thus  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘  = 0. If Dk is lower than dj ,  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘  is 
directly proportional to Dk and inversely proportional to dj. Each user in the networks 
tends to access the channel with higher matching factor 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘  . Thus spectrum with 
high quality tends to be used by the higher demand user and vice versa. Finally 
combine all the three matching factor, we introduced overall demand matching 
factor. 
                                     
j,k = 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛1(𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛2 (𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛3                                        (11) 
 𝜌𝜌 is the parameter to adjust the matching factor value and n1,n2 and n3 ≥ 0 determine 
the steepness of the matching factor 𝛼𝛼j,k, 𝛽𝛽j,k and 𝛾𝛾j,k repectively.If n3=0, then (γj,k)𝑛𝑛3=1, this means power matching factor can be ignored. 
5.3 Spectrum Sharing Scenario 
The scenario shows in Figure 5.2. Three channels A, B and C are available for 
sharing and each channel is sub-divided into 6 slots. Three secondary users X, Y, Z 
are bidding for accessing the channel. Here, we consider that each channel has 
different characteristics. Secondary users prioritize the available channels based on 
its demand and mark one as proffered channel which will improve efficiency of 
spectrum utilization. Let the secondary user X prefers channel B. Similarly 
secondary user Y prefers channel C and secondary user Z prefer channel A. Here we 
consider that each secondary user need total six slots for completing their operation. 
Channel choices of three users are as follows: 
X =(A=2,B=3,C=1),Y=(A=1,B=2,C=3),Z=(A=3,B=1,C=2)  
26 
The above mentioned choices can be expressed through matrix bidding language. 
The table 1 represents X, Y and Z matrix bids. 
 
Figure 5.2: Available spectrum slots allocation. 
 
Figure 5.3:  Available Spectrum slot auction. 
The above scenario we can express through matrix bidding language. When player 
submit their bids, they will use the trade price. 
Explanation about secondary user X’s, matrix bid is given here. X give highest 
priority to channel B so X’s put price $10 for three slots from channel B, means that 
X need at exactly three slots from channel B. But slots may any combination such as  
({1,2,3},{2,3,4},{3,4,5},{1,4,5}.....).  X will not accept less than 3 slots. X put 2nd 
highest priority to channel A and put  price $8 , that means X need exactly two slots 
from channel A and slots combination({1,2},{2,3}.....). 
So the bid of X will be 
Bid No. Price Ch A Ch B Ch C 
1 23 3 2 1 
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Table 5.1: X, Y and Z’s Matrix Bid representation.
Secondary user X’s Bid 
Channel 
Priority 
 Bidding 
Combination of 
Slots 
    
 
 
CH- B 
Slot1 0 
Slot2 0     0 
Slot3 0     0    10 
Slot4 0     0    10    0 
Slot5 0     0    10    0   0 
Slot6 0     0    10    0   0  0 
 
 
CH-A 
Slot1 0 
Slot2 0     8 
Slot3 0     8    0 
Slot4 0     8    0    0 
Slot5 0     8    0    0   0 
Slot6 0     8    0    0   0  0 
 
 
CH-C 
Slot1 5 
Slot2 5     0 
Slot3 5     0    0 
Slot4 5     0    0    0 
Slot5 5     0    0    0    0 
Slot6 5     0     0    0   0  0 
 
Secondary User Z’s Bid 
Channel 
Priority 
 Bidding 
Combination of 
Slots 
 
 
 
CH- A 
Slot1 0 
Slot2 0     0 
Slot3 0     0    10 
Slot4 0     0    10    0 
Slot5 0     0    10    0   0 
Slot6 0     0    10    0   0  0 
 
 
CH-C 
Slot1 0 
Slot2 0     8 
Slot3 0     8    0 
Slot4 0     8    0    0 
Slot5 0     8    0    0   0 
Slot6 0     8    0    0   0  0 
 
 
CH-B 
Slot1 5 
Slot2 5     0 
Slot3 5     0    0 
Slot4 5     0    0    0 
Slot5 5     0    0    0    0 
Slot6 5     0     0    0   0  0 
 
 
Secondary user Y’s Bid 
Channel 
Priority 
 Bidding 
Combination  
of Slots 
 
 
 
CH- C 
Slot1 0 
Slot2 0     0 
Slot3 0     0    10 
Slot4 0     0    10    0 
Slot5 0     0    10    0   0 
Slot6 0     0    10    0   0  0 
 
 
CH-B 
Slot1 0 
Slot2 0     8 
Slot3 0     8    0 
Slot4 0     8    0    0 
Slot5 0     8    0    0   0 
Slot6 0     8    0    0   0  0 
 
 
CH-A 
Slot1 5 
Slot2 5     0 
Slot3 5     0    0 
Slot4 5     0    0    0 
Slot5 5     0    0    0    0 
Slot6 5     0     0    0   0  0 
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Through Matrix bidding language one secondary user can send multi bid for access 
resources and also here secondary users behave truthfully. Not only that but also 
secondary users can shows their preferences on channels. 
5.4 Comparison Matrix Bid vs XOR Bid 
The following example shows the benefits of matrix bidding over other bidding 
languages. Let we think about an auction for N = 6 items and a bidder wants to 
express an additive valuation over the items with a constraint that he cannot consume 
more than 3 items [13]. A matrix bid expressing this (with arbitrary values given for 
each item) is as follows: 
Table 5.2: Matrix Bid for 6 goods. 
 
 
 
With this bid, we see that bidder willing to pay same price for each item regardless of 
what other items he gets. The zeros are shown in the fourth, fifth, and sixth columns 
of Table 2 which mean that bidder is not interested to pay a positive amount for a 
fourth, fifth, or sixth item. This matrix bid expressed in XOR language which shown 
in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: XOR bid for 6 goods. 
(A:22VB:18VC:17) ⊕ (A:22VB:18VD:16)  ⊕ 
(A:22VB:18VE:14) ⊕ (A:22VB:18VF:12) ⊕ 
(A:22VC:17VD:16) ⊕ (A:22VC:17VE:14) ⊕ 
(A:22VC:17VF:12) ⊕ (A:22VD:16VE:14) ⊕ 
(A:22VD:16VE:14) ⊕ (A:22VE:14VF:12) ⊕ 
(B:18VC:17VD:16) ⊕ (B:18VC:17VE:14)  ⊕ 
(B:18VC:17VF:12) ⊕ (B:18VD:16VE:14) ⊕ 
(B:18VD:16VF:12) ⊕ (B:18VE:14VF:12) ⊕ 
(C:17VD:16VE:14) ⊕ (C:17VD:16VF:12) ⊕ 
(C:17VE:14VF:12)  ⊕ (D:16VE:14VF:12)  
Note that if we were to add another item to the auction and maintain the capacity 
constraint of three items, we would have to add 15 new XOR clauses to the above 
 
C 
h 
a 
n 
n 
e 
l 
 
Cost 
A 22      
B 18 18     
C 17 17 17    
D 16 16 16 0   
E 14 14 14 0 0  
F 12 12 12 0 0 0 
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statement of preferences, while only adding 7 new numbers (one new row) to the 
matrix bid!In general, additive preferences for n items with a capacity constraint of k 
takes �𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘� clauses, each containing k atomic bids in the language of Lflat , or a single 
matrix bid of size 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛−1)2 ,, verifying that LMB can contain preferences in a single 
matrix bid that require a sentence of exponential length in Lflat. 
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6.  SIMULATION RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we explain our simulation to evaluate the performance of non 
cooperative matrix bid multi unit combinatorial auction in cognitive radio network. 
Initially for each secondary user we computed demand matching factor ωj,k and on 
the basis of ωj,k each secondary user will put channel priority in its bids.  We use 
MATLAB for computing ωj,k
 
. 
Table 6.1:  Simulation Parameter for computing demand matching factor. 
Symbol Quantity Value 
K number of channels 20 
N number of unlicensed user                  5~40 
M number of slots                                     6 
ej user’s acceptable error rate                10-8- 10-4 
Ek Channel’s wireless link error rate       10-9-10-4 
dj User’s delay bound                            10ms-100ms 
Dk Channel’s link layer delay                 1ms- 100ms 
qj Users required transmission power   10mW-40mW 
Qk Channel’s transmission   power        10mW-200mW          
Computing the ωj,k each secondary user create its own matrix bid and send to the 
auctioneer. A sample bid which we used in our simulation shown in Table 6.1. 
Combinatorial auction finally select the winning bid set. We try to evaluate spectrum 
utilization. In Figure 6.3 we see that as the number of secondary users increases the 
percentage of spectrum utilization also increases. We compare our results with two 
other sharing methods DMMS (Demand Matching Spectrum Sharing) [14] and 
BIOSS (BIOlogical-inspired Spectrum Sharing) [11]. We took three results CASS1 
(Combinatorial Auction Based Spectrum Sharing), CASS2 and CASS3. 
Table 6.2: Combinatorial auction Simulation parameters. 
No. of Channels 
No. of Bids 
No. of Slots per Channel 
No. of Dummy Channels (optional) 
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In CASS1 where each secondary user sends bid to auctioneer their first and second 
best matching channel. We see that CASS1 strategy give 60% spectrum utilization 
while each secondary user accesses the single channel leaving a number of available 
channels unused. In CASS2, each secondary user sends bid to auctioneer its all 
possible matching channels, we examine that CASS2 give 75% spectrum utilization 
leaving a few available channels unused. In CASS2 each secondary user also gets 
accesses the single channel. So finally we use CASS3 strategy where each secondary 
user can access multiple channels and we observe that CASS3 give us 90% spectrum 
utilization. Subsequent to analyzing spectrum utilization we focus to maximize 
revenue for single bid combinatorial auction and multi-bids combinatorial auction. 
Figure 6.2 shows that when each secondary user sends multi-bids rather than single 
bid, multi-bids strategy always maximizes revenue, increases number secondary 
users and increases the slot utilization. In the concern of fairness issue, auction is a 
non-cooperative system, every secondary user behave truthfully when submitting 
their bid. Auctioneers allocate available channels to the secondary users to find out 
best possible allocation according to secondary users requests. From the simulation 
results, we saw that upto 25 secondary users, CASS always shows the better 
performance than two other methods BIOSS and DMSS. But when number of users 
are increasing then CASS performance a bit lower than DMSS. The reason behind 
that when number of users are increasing, a number of secondary users are not 
getting access to the available channels. Therefore a number of channels are still 
unused. The performance of BIOSS is low because of imperfect channel selection.  
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Table 6.3: Sample bid (20 channel and 15 secondary users). 
  Channel No  
Bid 
No 
 
Price  
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
1
8 
1
9 
 
SU 
0 100                    5 1 
1 100    5                 2 
2 50   5                  2 
3 20            5         2 
4 10      5               2 
5 20                   5  2 
6 100      5               4 
7 15 5                    4 
8 16          5           4 
9 100                    5 5 
10 100          5    5       6 
11 100             5        7 
12 100           5          8 
13 105           5 5       5  8 
14 12   5                  8 
15 100          5           9 
16 102          5    5       9 
17 100          5           10 
18 102          5    5       10 
19 100             5        11 
20 20  5                   11 
21 120  5           5        11 
22 100 5                    12 
23 100            5         13 
24 60      5               13 
25 40     5                13 
26 100     5 5               13 
27 100                 5    14 
28 100      5               15 
29 16 5                    15 
30 15          5           15 
31 40 5         5          5 15 
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Figure 6.1: Spectrum utilization of CASS, DMSS and BIOS with different   
number of unlicensed users. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Revenue, winning user and slot analysis for single and multi bid CASS. 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we proposed a Matrix bid multi units combinatorial auction spectrum 
sharing scheme for cognitive radio networks. Two vital points in CR networks, first 
one is primary user always try to maximize revenue and the second one is efficient 
allocation of available spectrum to the secondary users. We see that our proposed 
scheme fulfil two aims that maximize revenue of primary users as well as allocate all 
the available channels to the secondary users. Because of secondary user sends multi 
bids and no selfishness between them. So there is no coordination delay. Primary 
user has option to choose best bid for a secondary user from multi bids. Simulation 
analysis shows that matrix bid multi units combinatorial auction achieves high 
performance in spectrum utilization where percentage nearly 90%. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: Sample results of our simulation. 
 
 
Figure A.1: Input bid file for 20 channels and 30 users. 
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FigureA.2: Winning result for 20 channels and 30 users. 
 
 
FigureA.3: Input bid file for 20 channels and 20 users. 
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FigureA.4: Winning result for 20 channels and 20 users. 
 
 
 
FigureA.5: Input bid file for 20 channels and 15 users. 
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FigureA.6: Winning result for 20 channels and 15 users. 
 
 
Figure A.7: Input bid file for 20 channels and 10 users. 
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Figure A.8: Winning result for 20 channels and 10 users. 
 
 
Figure A.9: Input bid file for 20 channels and 5 users. 
 
 
Figure A.10: Winning result for 20 channels and 5 users. 
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